Yale University

EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Cowles Foundation

5-1-2020

Recursive Preferences, the Value of Life, and Household Finance
Antoine Bommier
Daniel Harenberg
François Le Grand
Cormac O'Dea
Yale University

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Bommier, Antoine; Harenberg, Daniel; Le Grand, François; and O'Dea, Cormac, "Recursive Preferences, the
Value of Life, and Household Finance" (2020). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 2589.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/2589

This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Cowles Foundation at EliScholar – A
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cowles Foundation
Discussion Papers by an authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at
Yale. For more information, please contact elischolar@yale.edu.

RECURSIVE PREFERENCES, THE VALUE OF LIFE, AND HOUSEHOLD FINANCE
By

Antoine Bommier, Daniel Harenberg, François Le Grand, and Cormac O'Dea
May 2020
Revised December 2020

COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 2231R

COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS
YALE UNIVERSITY
Box 208281
New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8281
http://cowles.yale.edu/

Recursive Preferences, the Value of Life, and
Household Finance∗
Antoine Bommier

Daniel Harenberg

François Le Grand

Cormac O’Dea†
December 18, 2020
Abstract
We analyze lifecycle saving strategies using a recursive utility model
calibrated to match empirical estimates of the value of a statistical life. The
novelty of our approach is that we require preferences to be monotone with
respect to first order stochastic dominance. The framework we use can
disentangle risk aversion and the intertemporal elasticity and can feature
a positive value of life without placing constraints on the value of the risk
aversion parameter or the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. We show
that, with a positive value of life, risk aversion reduces savings, decreases
stock market participation and decreases annuity purchase. Risk averse
agents are willing to make an early death a not-so-adverse outcome by
enjoying greater consumption when young and bequeathing wealth in case of
death. The model can rationalize low annuity demand while also matching
empirically documented levels of wealth and private investments in stocks.

Keywords: lifecycle model, value of life, risk aversion, saving choices, portfolio
choices, annuity puzzle, recursive utility.
JEL codes: D91, G11, J14, J17.
∗

We would like to thank Francisco Gomes, Michael Haliassos, Felix Kubler, Alexander
Michaelides, Stephanie Weber and seminar participants at the University of Zurich, Goethe
University Frankfurt, Bielefeld University, University of Cologne, the Paris School of Economics,
Luxembourg School of Finance, Collegio Carlo Alberto in Turin, the QSPS workshop in Utah,
the CEPR household finance workshop, the Netspar International Pension Workshop, ESEM, and
the annual meetings of SAET and the Verein für Socialpolitik for their very helpful comments.
We are also very grateful to John Bailey Jones for sharing data underlying graphs in his previous
published work. A previous version of this paper circulated under the title “Household Finance
and the Value of Life”.
†
Bommier:
ETH Zurich, Zürichbergstr. 18, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland, e-mail:
abommier@ethz.ch; Harenberg: ETH Zurich, Switzerland, and Oxford Economics Ltd., Germany,
e-mail: dan.harenberg@gmail.com; Le Grand: EMLyon Business School, 23 avenue Guy de Collongue, CS 40203, 69134 Ecully Cedex, France, and ETH Zurich, e-mail: legrand@em-lyon.com;
O’Dea: Yale University, NBER and IFS, 37 Hillhouse Ave., New Haven, CT, USA, e-mail:
cormac.odea@yale.edu. Bommier, Harenberg, and Le Grand gratefully acknowledge support
from Swiss-Re Foundation and ETH Zurich Foundation. O’Dea gratefully acknowledges funding
from the Economic and Social Research Council (grant number ES/P001831/1).

1

1

Introduction

“Nothing, they say is more certain than death, and nothing more uncertain than
the time of dying” – Thomas Paine.
The certainty of death, and the unpredictability of its timing, are fundamental
features of human existence. Any analysis of an aspect of human behavior to which
mortality is relevant has to reflect on how people react to lifetime uncertainty and
to how they respond to opportunities to modify their mortality risk. A coherent
framework for investigating the interaction between human behavior and mortality
risk is particularly relevant in a period where the risk of dying could change
significantly due to medical progress, or due to the occurrence of novel risks.
Although there are some exceptions, the economic literature on such matters is
mostly split in two branches, depending on whether mortality risk is considered to
be exogenous or endogenous. On the one hand, papers in the Household Finance
literature (hereafter HF) tackle questions related to consumption, saving and
financial portfolio choices over the lifecycle. Mortality is usually considered to be
exogenous, and as such, the willingness to pay for mortality risk reduction tends to
be not taken into consideration.
On the other hand, the literature on the value of life (hereafter VoL) considers
questions related to endogenous mortality risk reduction. This literature studies
the trade-off between wealth and mortality, which is key to the evaluation of public
policies aiming at lowering mortality risk – such as road safety investments, public
health spending or nonpharmaceutical interventions during a pandemic. Papers in
this literature have paid limited attention to saving behaviors or portfolio choices
and how they interact with mortality risk.
Both strands of literature were initiated with contributions relying on the same
decision model: the standard additive expected utility model, as introduced by
Yaari (1965) in the HF literature and used by Shepard and Zeckhauser (1984) and
Rosen (1988) in the VoL literature. There was therefore a single model of rational
behavior that could be used to discuss both kinds of related issues. However,
the additive model was criticized by both literature strands. The HF literature
emphasized the limitation of the additive model’s intertwining of risk aversion and
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES). Some contributions to the VoL
literature further found fault with the additive model for implying that agents
unavoidably prefer death to life when their consumption gets small enough and
when the IES is below one (see e.g., Marshall, 1984 or Rosen, 1988).
Both lines of literature tried to circumvent these difficulties by adopting recursive
specifications inspired by the framework of Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990) –
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which are usually referred to as EZW preferences. However, the two branches of the
literature followed radically different and mutually incompatible choices regarding
preference parameters. Due to their focus on saving behavior and portfolio choices,
papers in the HF literature typically assume a coefficient of risk aversion above
one. This, however, yields EZW specifications that are inadequate for VoL matters,
since these specifications suggest that people would prefer to have shorter lives (see
our discussion in Section 2.3). To ensure that life is worth living in their models,
papers in the VoL literature instead assume a coefficient of risk aversion below one.
In this case however, unless the elasticity of substitution is restricted to be greater
than one, EZW specifications raise definitional issues when applied to realistic
mortality patterns and yield counterfactual predictions for lifecycle behaviors (also
discussed in Section 2.3).
Considered together, these developments in the HF and VoL literature represent
a fragmented approach where a given form of rationality is used when focusing
on saving behavior and portfolio choice and another one, incompatible with the
former, is used when discussing endogenous changes to mortality risk. These
different approaches imply contradictory associations between mortality risk and
the propensity to save.1 This relation between mortality risk and saving behaviors
is, however, essential for understanding the impact of ongoing mortality changes
on household wealth accumulation both at the micro and the macro levels, and for
many issues in the economics of aging. There is therefore a need for clarification
of the full role of mortality in models of household behavior, and, above all, for a
consistent framework that can be used for jointly modeling choices over savings
and choices related to mortality risk while being well-defined without imposing
ad-hoc restrictions on the IES or risk aversion.
The contribution of the current paper is threefold. First, we introduce a flexible,
well-behaved recursive framework that can be used in both lines of literature.
Central to our approach is that we restrict our attention to models which, like the
standard additive expected utility model, are monotone with respect to first-order
stochastic dominance. As as we explain in the following paragraph, this property
is essential for affording an intuitive understanding of how mortality risk and
risk aversion together impact household behavior. Our specification also makes it
possible to disentangle the IES and risk aversion without restricting the values of
either parameter. It can further accommodate positive (as well as negative) values
of life, independently of the assumptions made regarding the IES or risk aversion.
1

Recursive models in the HF literature, which usually focus on the case where the IES is
below one, find that the propensity to save increases with the likelihood of surviving to the next
period. Falls in mortality risk would then generate an increase in (age-specific) savings rates. The
opposite association is found in models from the VoL literature which assume an IES below one.
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Second, using this framework, we formally characterize the impact of risk aversion
on savings behaviors and annuity demand, in a stylized two-period framework where
mortality is the only risk at play. These results emphasize the role of the value
of life which is shown to be a fundamental element for understanding the impact
of risk aversion on household consumption and saving behavior in the presence of
mortality risk. Last, we provide a quantitative application of our framework to a
multi-period and multi-risk setting. We compare the predictions of our model to
those of the standard additive model and also contrast our results with those of
previous studies that used recursive models. The starkest difference between our
quantitative model and the standard additive model is in the ability of the former to
rationalize low annuity demand. Low annuity demand occurs as a natural outcome
of a standard calibration in our model, whereas annuity demand is counterfactually
high in the standard model (a manifestation of the so-called ‘annuity puzzle’ – e.g.,
Yaari, 1965 or Davidoff et al., 2005). We also find that the role of risk aversion
differs from the one found in other studies based on recursive models, precisely
because we use a well-behaved specification that features a positive value of life.
The keystone of our contribution is to use a model that fulfills a property of
monotonicity with respect to first-order stochastic dominance. Such a property
rules out the choice of dominated strategies. Monotonicity has long been seen as
a natural aspect of rationality (see for example Arrow, 1951) and it was only in
the late 1980s that some non-monotone models, such as EZW preferences, became
widely used in applications.2 The main purpose of EZW specifications was to allow
for tractable and flexible models, which was guaranteed by preference homotheticity
and the possibility of disentangling risk aversion and IES. This has facilitated the
investigation of numerous research questions and has made them an important tool
for the study of household behavior. The cost of the tractability and flexibility,
though, is the departure from monotonicity, which is not innocuous. An agent
endowed with EZW preferences can opt for some choices that offer worse outcomes
in all states of the world than other available choices (see Lemma 3 in Bommier
et al., 2017 or Section 2.4 of the current paper). This is analogous to following
dominated strategies in a game theoretic context. Moreover, in non-monotone
set-ups risk aversion no longer has a straightforward effect on agents’ decisions.
To illustrate this last point, let us take a small detour, and consider an agent who
faces the risk of flooding, and can purchase some flood insurance. From an ex-post
point of view, if there is flooding, welfare would be improved by having purchased
2

Another well-known model that is non-monotone is prospect theory, in its original formulation
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). To remedy this non-monotonicity, Tversky and Kahneman (1986)
proposed cumulative prospect theory, which is now the most commonly used version.
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insurance; if there is no flooding, welfare would be hurt by having purchased
it. The agent’s decision about the quantity of insurance to be purchased has,
however, to be taken ex-ante, before knowing whether flooding will occur. Under
preference monotonicity, the decision can be seen as involving a trade-off between
the welfare obtained in case of flooding and the welfare in case of no flooding. This
interpretation of trading-off the welfare in different states of the world is impossible
if non-monotone preferences are assumed, since the agent could take a decision that
would lower the welfare in all states of the world. In a monotone framework, where
choice under uncertainty amounts to trading-off welfare levels obtained in different
states of the world, risk aversion simply drives how much weight is given to bad
states as compared to good states. In mathematical representations, risk aversion is
obtained by affording greater marginal utilities to bad states, for example through
the concavity of the utility function (as in the expected utility framework) or
through probability transformations (as in the dual model of Yaari, 1987). In our
example, if floods are adverse events for the agents, then risk aversion would lead
an agent to increase welfare in states of the world where flooding occurs, that
is, risk aversion would lead them to increase insurance purchase.3 Note however,
that in our example, an inverse relationship would hold if agent saw flooding as a
positive event (for example, if flooding improved the fertility of her land).4 Under
preference monotonicity, the relationship between risk aversion and behavior is
therefore very intuitive, and naturally depends on whether the occurrence of the
uncertain event is perceived as a favorable or as an unfavorable outcome.
Returning to the focus of the current paper, let us now consider a decision
problem faced by an agent where the risk is death rather than flooding. An agent
who cannot anticipate when she will die, and whose preferences are monotone, has
to make trade-offs between the (lifetime) welfare she would obtain if dying young
and that obtained if dying old. To improve welfare in the case of a short life, the
agent can consume a lot when young (and thus save little) and keep resources to
be bequeathed in case of death (and thus invest little in annuities). Such strategies
tend to decrease welfare in case of long lives (since consumption will then be low
at old ages). The effect of risk aversion on saving and annuity demand depends on
whether an early death is seen as an adverse event or not, that is on the sign of
the value of life. Under the plausible assumption that the value of life is positive,
3

In textbooks, this well-known relation between risk aversion and insurance demand is usually
derived in the expected utility framework, but the relation extends to any model which is monotone
with respect to stochastic dominance (see e.g., Bommier et al., 2012).
4
If flooding is a positive event, the agent wants to “sell-short” flood insurance contracts, in
other words to hold a negative amount of flooding insurance contracts. The optimum amount to
be held then diminishes (i.e. becomes more negative) with agent’s risk aversion.
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that is when having a short life is seen as an adverse realization, one should expect
risk aversion to decrease savings and annuity purchases – in order to improve the
welfare in the bad state of the world. Such intuitive reasoning is formalized in the
theoretical part of the paper (Section 3), and is what drives the findings of our
quantitative analysis (Section 4).
Imposing preference monotonicity restricts, of course, the set of admissible
preference specifications. While this rules out EZW specifications (except those
where the IES is equal to one), it allows for additive and risk-sensitive preferences.
The latter preferences, initially introduced by Hansen and Sargent (1995), were
shown by Bommier et al. (2017) to be the only recursive preferences to afford
the flexibility to separate risk aversion and intertemporal substitutability while
preserving monotonicity, recursivity and the structure of Kreps and Porteus (1978)
preferences. Their recursive structure makes them amenable to computational
implementation.5 Furthermore, in this paper, we show in Section 4.6 that the
structure can be approximated by an additive model with a time-varying discount
rate. The route we pursue is therefore quite an accessible one. Relying on preference
monotonicity, it yields an intuitive interpretation of the impact of risk aversion on
household decisions in the presence of mortality risk.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide a theoretical review
of recursive preferences, including additive, EZW and risk-sensitive preferences.
We highlight, in particular, the meaning of preference monotonicity. In Section
3, we consider a simple two-period model, in which we derive theoretical results
regarding the impact of risk aversion on saving and annuity demand when the only
risk is mortality risk. In Section 4, we outline our quantitative model with multiple
periods and multiple risks and discuss its implications for saving behavior and, in
particular, annuity demand. In Section 5, we relate our results on the role of risk
aversion to previous results in the HF and VoL literature. Section 6 concludes.

2

Recursive models

2.1

The additive model

The most popular framework in both the HF and the VoL literature is the timeadditive expected utility model. To link with the rest of the paper, we provide its
recursive definition:
Ut = (1 − β)u(ct ) + βE[Ut+1 ],
(1)
5

Such preferences are used in applied settings, for instance, in Anderson (2005) or Bäuerle
and Jaśkiewicz (2018).

6

where Ut is utility at time t, β ∈ (0, 1) is a time preference parameter and u(ct )
is the instantaneous utility derived from consumption at time t.6 Accounting for
mortality is achieved by assigning a utility level, ud , obtained when death occurs.
As it is generally assumed that mortality risk is independent of other risks, the
expectation can be decomposed in two stages, one that accounts for the risk of
mortality and one that accounts for other risks. Formally denoting the utility
conditional on being alive at time t by Vt and the probability of surviving from
period t to t + 1 by πt the recursion (1) yields:
Vt = (1 − β)u(ct ) + β (πt E[Vt+1 ] + (1 − πt )ud ) .

(2)

Additive preferences, as defined in the above equation, are invariant when changing
u and ud (and Vt ) by the same positive affine transformation. It is therefore
possible to assume, without loss of generality, that the utility of death is set to
zero (ud = 0). If one assumes a constant IES, the function u has to be of the form
1−σ
u(c) = ul + K c1−σ for some constant ul (the subscript l stands for “life”) and a
positive scalar K. The IES is then given by σ1 . By (multiplicative) normalization,
the scalar K can be set equal to 1. It is not possible, however, to make a second
normalization and set ul to zero, since the zero utility level is already pinned
down as representing the utility of death. The parameter ul , which determines the
utility gap between life and death, is thus an important preference parameter. It is
noteworthy that when mortality is exogenous, the constant ul only contributes to
an exogenous additive term that has no impact on the ordering of consumption
profiles. This explains why the constant ul is generally ignored in all studies that
assume an exogenous mortality pattern but is explicitly mentioned in the VoL
literature (see, for example, the discussion in Hall and Jones, 2007).
The additive specification has been criticized for its lack of flexibility. In line
with Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990), papers in the literature expressed
concerns regarding its inability to disentangle the IES from risk aversion.7
6

The additive model is frequently defined using the recursion Ut = u(ct ) + βE[Ut+1 ], which is,
of course, equivalent to (1), up to a multiplicative renormalization of the function u.
7
In addition, some papers in the VoL literature emphasized the fact that when the IES is
smaller than one (i.e., σ1 < 1), life becomes unavoidably worse than death when consumption gets
small enough (see, e.g., Rosen, 1988). This creates an incentive to enter into Russian-roulette
games, so as to avoid having to live in a state which is worse than death. This feature may however
be seen as a theoretical curiosity, with no consequences in applications as long as consumption
stays above the threshold that would make life just as good as death.
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2.2

Recursive models with mortality

The search for greater flexibility led researchers contributing to each of the HF and
the VoL literatures to adopt non-additive recursive models for preferences. These
models assume that utility Ut at any date t is defined by the following recursion:
Ut = f −1 ((1 − β)u(ct ) + βφ−1 (E[φf (Ut+1 )]),

(3)

where φ is an increasing function representing risk preferences and f is a normalization device that can be any increasing function. As in the additive model
of Section 2.1, β ∈ (0, 1) is a time preference parameter and u(ct ) is the instantaneous utility function. The function f has no impact on preferences and its
role is to facilitate convenient representations of the recursion. A common choice
is f (x) = x, as in the additive specification (1), and which we will use for the
representation of risk-sensitive preferences in Section 2.5. Another common choice
for f , most often introduced in the case of EZW preferences – see Section 2.3 –
involves using the same CRRA function as that used for the instantaneous utility:
1−σ
f (x) = u(x) = x1−σ .8
As in the additive case, we can derive, from equation (3), the recursion defining
the utility conditional on being alive at time t:




Vt = f −1 (1 − β)u(ct ) + βφ−1 (πt E[φf (Vt+1 )] + (1 − πt )φf (ud )) .

(4)

Here, again, ud denotes the utility level assigned to death and mortality risk is
assumed to be independent of other risks.

2.3

Homothetic EZW preferences

A popular recursive specification is that of Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil
1−σ
(1990), which is obtained from equation (3), with u(c) = f (c) = c1−σ , and φ(x) =
1
1−γ

1−γ

((1 − σ)x) 1−σ . This yields:


Ut = (1 −

β)ct1−σ

+β



1−γ
E[Ut+1
]

1
 1−σ  1−σ
1−γ

.

(5)

When σ = γ, we obtain the additive model – up to the transformation by f . With
γ > σ, as is usually assumed in the HF literature, EZW exhibit preference for early
resolution of uncertainty. The magnitude of the implied timing premia is discussed
in Epstein et al. (2014).
8

Such a normalization implies that an infinitely long consumption path providing the same
consumption c in all periods yields a lifetime utility equal to c.
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The recursion (4), which gives the utility conditional on being alive, is now:


Vt = (1 −

β)c1−σ
t

+β



1−γ
πt E[Vt+1
]

+ (1 −

πt )ud1−γ

1
 1−σ  1−σ
1−γ

.

(6)

It is worth emphasizing that in specification (6), choosing a specific value for ud is
not a normalization choice, since changing ud would impact individual preferences.
The HF and VoL literatures at this point follow two different (and incompatible)
routes. In the HF literature, the standard assumption is to choose a coefficient
of risk aversion γ > 1. In order to get a homothetic specification, it is moreover
assumed that u1−γ
= 0 and thus, implicitly, that the utility of death is ud = +∞.
d
The recursion (6) reduces then to:


Vt = (1 −

β)c1−σ
t

1−σ
1−γ

+ βπt



1−γ
E[Vt+1
]

1
 1−σ  1−σ
1−γ

,

(7)

as is the case, for example, in Gomes and Michaelides (2008). Clearly, setting ud =
+∞ involves assuming that death is preferable to life, regardless of consumption
levels. This has the consequence that utility is declining with survival probability
t
( ∂V
< 0).9 Since the HF literature focuses on cases where mortality is exogenous,
∂πt
one could think that this assumption is harmless. We will show in Section 3 that
this is not the case.
Assuming that death is preferable to life precludes the use of the model to study
VoL issues. For this reason, rather than assuming γ > 1 and ud = +∞ , Hugonnier
et al. (2013) and Córdoba and Ripoll (2017) suggest the imposition of γ < 1 and
ud = 0, which again yields the recursion (7). An additional issue arises, however,
when considering the case where the IES is smaller than one ( σ1 < 1), which is
the relevant case in most of the literature (see the meta-analysis of Havránek,
2015). When applied to realistic mortality patterns (with πt small at old ages),
the recursion (7) admits a unique solution, which is the null function: Vt = 0
independent of the consumption profile. Therefore, all feasible consumption profiles
are optimal. Moreover, computing first-order conditions implied by recursion (7),
while ignoring that the solution is Vt = 0, yields consumption profiles where agents
consume almost nothing early in the lifecycle to sustain a very high consumption at
old ages. We will illustrate this phenomenon in the context of a simple cake-eating
example in Section 2.4. These implications are avoided in Hugonnier et al. (2013)
by assuming a model of perpetual youth, where mortality risk remains small at all
ages. In Córdoba and Ripoll (2017), these issues are avoided by the introduction

 1−σ
1−γ
1−γ
β
t
Equation (7) yields ∂V
=
E[V
]
Vtσ , which has the same sign as 1 − γ. See
t+1
∂πt
1−γ
Section 5 for further discussion.
9

9

of an ad hoc (exogenous) health profile, which has the property that greater health
implies a lower utility level. The problem of a negative value of life is solved by
introducing another one: that of a negative value of health.10 We refer to Bommier
et al. (2018) for an extensive discussion of these issues. Zhang et al. (2018) provide
further criticisms regarding the role of the σ parameter when using recursion (7).
We conclude that there is room for a more general approach, which can allow
risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution to be disentangled
without placing constraints on the signs or values of those parameters or on the
value of life. Rather than bringing a new specification chosen for its tractability,
we suggest the imposition of a natural property: preference monotonicity.

2.4

Preference monotonicity

Monotonicity with respect to first-order stochastic dominance (see Bommier and
LeGrand, 2014a for a formal definition) stipulates that an agent will not take
an action if another one would be preferable in all future circumstances. This
property, which is similar to the elimination of dominated strategies in game theory,
seems to be a reasonable requirement when modeling individual rationality (see
the discussion in Arrow, 1951). The standard additive model is monotone, but
only few recursive extensions are monotone. Bommier et al. (2017) show that EZW
preferences are non-monotone, except when an IES equal to one is assumed.11
The non-monotonicity feature of EZW preferences can be illustrated in various
settings. For example, Bommier et al. (2017) consider the case of saving behavior
with uncertain income and asset returns, in the absence of mortality risk. To get
closer to the problem considered by the current paper, we give below an example
where EZW preferences yield dominated choices in settings where the uncertainty
is solely related to mortality.
10

Córdoba and Ripoll (2017) extend (7) by assuming that:
Vt =

1

 1−σ
1−σ
1−γ 1−σ
1−γ
1−γ
(1 − β)Ht c1−σ
+
βπ
(E[V
])
,
t
t
t+1

where Ht is an exogenous health profile. By choosing an appropriate health profile, it is then
possible to match any possible consumption profile. The calibration in their paper leads to the
choice of a profile Ht that rapidly declines with age – so as to mechanically counterbalance the
counterfactual increase in consumption arising in that model when the IES is smaller than one.
When the IES is smaller than one (i.e., σ1 < 1), the model implies that health has a negative
∂Vt
impact on welfare: ∂H
< 0.
t
11
When the IES equals one (i.e., the limit case where σ → 1), EZW preferences enter in the
class of risk-sensitive preferences that we consider in Section 2.5.
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The example of a cake-eating problem. We consider a two-period saving
problem of an agent who has EZW preferences and who is faced with an exogenous
probability (π0 ∈ (0, 1)) of surviving to the second period. The agent is endowed
with an initial amount of wealth w0 , and no additional source of revenue, has to
decide in period 0, how much to save for period 1. We assume that the agent has
to choose an amount b to be invested in a risk-free bond whose return is equal to
1
. Using equation (7), the decision problem is therefore:
β
1−σ

max (1 − β)(w0 − b)
b∈R+

1−σ
1−γ

+ βπ0

b
(1 − β)( )1−σ
β

!

1
1−σ

.

(8)

Ex ante, the agent foresees two possible states of the world. Either she lives only one
period, and (ex-post) lifetime utility would be maximized by consuming everything
in period 0 (zero savings: b = 0). Or she lives two periods and (ex-post) lifetime
w0
utility would be maximized with b = 1+β
in order to have the same consumption
level in both periods. The agent however, has to make a saving decision before
w0
knowing which state will be realized. Choosing a saving level above 1+β
would be
w0
a dominated choice since saving exactly 1+β would provide a higher ex-post utility
whether she survives or not.
w0
Simple derivations show that the solution to (8) is b∗ =
1 σ−1 . The interσ 1−γ

1+βπ0

σ−1
1−γ

esting case corresponds to
> 0, which occurs when risk aversion, γ, and the
w0
1
IES, σ , are both either below or above 1. In such a case, we obtain that b∗ > 1+β
,
indicating that the agent opts for a dominated strategy. When π0 becomes very
small, then b∗ even gets close to w0 . In other words, when the agent is almost sure
of dying at the end of the period 0, she decides to consume almost nothing in that
period, to keep all her resources for period 1 – a period that she will almost surely
never see. Such unpleasant features extend to multi-period settings, with similar
conclusions for saving behaviors.
In our example, non-monotonic choices appear when σ−1
> 0, but as shown
1−γ
in Bommier et al. (2017), the non-monotonicity of EZW preferences is generic,
except when an IES of one is assumed. In such cases, EZW preferences overlap
with risk-sensitive preferences that we introduce below.

2.5

Risk-sensitive preferences

Imposing monotonicity does not preclude the use of non-additive recursive models.
It does, however, dramatically reduce the set of recursive specifications that can
be used. It was shown in Bommier et al. (2017) that the only class of Kreps
and Porteus (1978) recursive preferences that is monotone and flexible enough
11

to disentangle risk aversion from the IES is the one provided by risk-sensitive
preferences. Such preferences correspond to the recursive setting where:
Ut = (1 − β)u(ct ) −



β
log Et [e−kUt+1 ] .
k

(9)

As was the case for EZW preferences, recursion (9) is a particular case of equation
−kx
(3), where f (x) = x, and φ(x) = 1−ek . The parameter k governs risk aversion,
where larger values of k are associated with more risk averse behavior. When
k → 0, recursion (9) converges toward the standard additive model of Section 2.1.
Risk-sensitive preferences with k > 0 exhibit a preference for early resolution of
uncertainty, the intensity of which vanishes when β gets close to one (Bommier
et al., 2017).
Intuitively, preferences represented by recursion (9) are monotone, as the term
(1−β)u(ct ) can be included
 inside the expectation.
 That is, recursion (9) can also be
k

written as Ut = − βk log E[e− β ((1−β)u(ct )+βUt+1 ) ] , implying that the choices at time
t involve maximizing an expectation, just like in the expected utility framework.
A feature that is worth emphasizing is that preferences defined by (9) are
invariant when adding a constant to the instantaneous utility function u. The
risk-sensitive model thus preserves one of the invariance properties of the additive
specification. This is convenient for normalization matters since, just like in the
additive model, it can be assumed that ud = 0 with no generality loss. The recursion
(4), giving utility conditional on being alive then becomes:
Vt = (1 − β)u(ct ) −



β
log πt E[e−kVt+1 ] + 1 − πt .
k

Interestingly risk-sensitive preferences do not constrain the IES to be constant,
since the function u can be be arbitrarily general.

3

Risk aversion, the value of live and saving behavior

As discussed in the introduction, with monotone preferences, a utility maximizing
choice under uncertainty can be seen as involving trade-offs between the ex-post
utilities obtained in all states of the world. Further, increasing risk aversion can be
understood as putting greater weight on “bad states” of the world. This section
formalizes this view of the role of risk aversion and also emphasizes the importance
of correctly distinguishing between good and bad states of the world. Regardless
of whether mortality is risk is endogenous or exogenous, risk aversion will have
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opposite effects depending on whether a long life is assumed to be a good outcome
(i.e., the value of mortality risk reduction is positive) or a bad outcome (i.e., the
value of mortality risk reduction is negative).
Formally, we consider here an agent who lives for at most two periods. In
period 0, the agent is endowed with a level of wealth w0 and has to make saving
and annuity purchase decisions. More precisely, the agent may invest in bonds,
which yield a safe return of Rf and which are bequeathed in case of death, or in
f
annuities, with return Rπ0 , but which are not bequeathable. Denoting by c0 and
c1 the consumption in the first and second periods, by b the amount invested in
bonds, by a the amount invested in annuities, and by x the amount bequeathed
in case of death, we have: w0 = c0 + b + a, c1 = Rf (b + πa0 ), and x = Rf b. The
agent is endowed with risk-sensitive preferences, as represented by equation (9).
However, the utility associated with death is not constant and equal to ud anymore,
but depends on the size of the bequest left by the agent. We denote by v(x) the
utility associated with bequeathing the amount x. The recursion (4) defining the
utility V0 representing the agent’s preferences becomes, in the presence of bequests:
V0 = (1 − β)u(c0 ) −



β
log π0 e−k(1−β)u(c1 ) + (1 − π0 )e−k(1−β)v(x) .
k
1−σ

(10)

1−σ

We further assume here that u(c) = ul + c1−σ and v(x) = ud + θ x1−σ , where the
scalar θ ≥ 0 quantifies the strength of the bequest motives. There is no consensus
on the formulation of v (known as a ‘warm-glow’ bequest function), but the form
we have chosen is the same as in Cocco et al. (2005), Inkmann et al. (2011) and
Yogo (2016).12 With no loss of generality, we can normalize the utility with ud = 0.
Note that further constraining utility by setting, for instance, ul = 0 would not be
a mere normalization and would impose constraints on the value of mortality risk
reduction. The larger is ul , the larger is the utility gap between life and death and
the larger is the value of mortality risk reduction. In particular, it follows from
(10) that:
c1−σ
1

∂V0
β
e−k(1−β)(ul + 1−σ ) − e−k(1−β)θ
=
∂π0
π0 e−k(1−β)u(c1 ) +(1 − π0 )e−k(1−β)v(x)
−k

x1−σ
1−σ

, (11)

0
implying that, for given c1 and w, people prefer longer lives ( ∂V
> 0) if ul is above
∂π0

θx1−σ −c1−σ
1
1−σ

0
while people prefer shorter lives ( ∂V
< 0) if ul is below that threshold.
∂π0
Let bk and ak be the optimal saving and annuity choices of an agent with risk

12

Other papers, such as De Nardi (2004), Lockwood (2012) or Bommier and LeGrand (2014b)
1−σ
consider a bequest utility of the form θ (x+x)
that is not homothetic but enables bequests to
1−σ
be modeled as a luxury good. We will use such a specification in the calibrated multi-period
quantitative model presented in Section 4.
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aversion k. Formally, the consumption-saving program can be written as:
(bk , ak ) = arg max 2 (1 − β)u(w0 − b − a)

(12)

(b,a)∈R+

β
−k(1−β)u(Rf b+Rf πa )
−k(1−β)v(Rf b)
0 + (1 − π )e
− log π0 e
0
k




We denote by c0,k = w0 − bk − ak and c1,k = Rf (bk + aπk0 ) the corresponding optimal
first- and second-period consumption levels. Here again, the case of additively
separable preferences is obtained by taking the limit as k → 0.
Proposition 1 Consider the consumption-saving problem in equation (12).
If k = 0, then the choices a0 and b0 , and hence the consumption levels c0,0 and
c1,0 , are independent of ul .
If k > 0 and ak > 0, we have:
0
– if ul such that ∂V
> 0 at the optimum (i.e., if the value of mortality risk
∂π0
∂c
∂c
k
k
reduction is positive), then ∂a
< 0, ∂b
> 0, ∂k0,k > 0 and ∂k1,k < 0;
∂k
∂k
0
– if ul such that ∂V
< 0 at the optimum (i.e., if the value of mortality risk
∂π0
∂c
∂c
k
k
> 0, ∂b
< 0, ∂k0,k < 0 and ∂k1,k > 0.
reduction is negative), then ∂a
∂k
∂k

The proof of Proposition 1 can be found in Appendix A.1. Here we will comment
on the results of Proposition 1, focusing on the case where k > 0 and ak > 0 (which
0
avoids corner solutions). We begin with the case where ∂V
> 0 at the optimum,
∂π0
that is, when the agent would prefer to have a greater survival probability. We
∂c
find that increasing risk aversion decreases second-period consumption ( ∂k1,k < 0),
∂
implying therefore that overall savings payoffs are reduced ( ∂k
(bk + aπk0 ) < 0).
k
Moreover, savings shift towards safe assets ( ∂b
> 0) at the expense of annuity
∂k
∂ak
purchases ( ∂k < 0). In fact, the greater the risk aversion, the more the agent is
concerned about the bad state, that is, the case where she would die after the first
period. To increase lifetime utility derived in the case that the bad state is realized,
∂c
she increases her first period consumption ( ∂k0,k > 0) and the amount she leaves as
k
bequest ( ∂b
> 0). At the same time, she purchases a smaller amount of annuities.
∂k
These choices make a short life a less adverse outcome. Of course, this comes at the
∂c
cost of a lower second-period consumption ( ∂k1,k < 0) and of a lower lifetime utility
∂
in case of survival (we prove in Appendix A.1 that ∂k
(u(c0,k ) + βu(c1,k )) < 0).
Interestingly, the findings look very different in the (counterfactual) case where
∂V0
< 0, that is, when the agent would prefer to have a lower survival probability. As
∂π0
shown in Proposition 1, the impact of an increase in risk aversion is systematically
reversed compared to the case where the value of mortality risk reduction is positive.
This follows intuitively from the fact that the impact of an increase in risk aversion
14

is to put greater weight on the bad state, and thus mechanically depends on which
0
< 0, the bad state is the one where the
state is actually the worst. When ∂V
∂π0
agent lives for two periods, and an agent with k > 0 purchases a larger amount of
annuities than an agent with additive preferences (k = 0), precisely to make such
a “bad outcome” not so bad. As we will see in Section 5, such matters related to
the sign of the value of life are key to understanding how our results contrast with
those of previous contributions.

4

A quantitative lifecycle model

Having argued why the value of life matters even in models with exogenous mortality
risk, this section outlines a multi-risk, multi-period, quantitative lifecycle model
which can be used to study the interplay between that risk, saving behavior,
portfolio choice and annuity purchases. The model’s innovation is to use, in an
otherwise standard lifecycle model, risk-sensitive preferences to ensure preference
recursivity and monotonicity while matching empirical estimates of the value of
mortality risk reduction.

4.1

The setup

We consider an economy of agents endowed with risk-sensitive preferences who face
risks over mortality, income and asset returns. Agents may save through a bond, a
risky asset and may insure against longevity risk by purchasing an annuity. Time
is discrete, a model period is a year, and time t corresponds to biological age minus
20. Agents enter the model at the start of working life, at t = 0. There is a single
consumption good, whose price serves as a numeraire.
Mortality risk. Agents face mortality risk, which is assumed to be exogenous
and independent of all other risks. If alive at date t, agents survive to date t + 1
with probability πt . There exists a date TM , such that the probability of living
after TM is πTM = 0.
Labor income risk. At any age, when alive, agents receive an income denoted
yt . They exogenously retire at date TR . During retirement (t ≥ TR ), agents receive
an annual pension income yt = y R . During working life (t < TR ), agents earn a
risky labor income yt = ytL , defined by ln ytL = µt + ζt . The sequence (µt )t≥0 is
a deterministic process that depends on age, and (ζt )t≥0 is an AR(1) stochastic
component, with persistence parameter ρ and innovation (υt )t≥0 , which is IID
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normally distributed with mean 0 and variance συ2 . We denote average earnings
over working life as ȳ.
Financial risk and security markets. Agents can save through bonds and
stocks and can purchase an annuity. The bond pays a constant risk-free gross
return, Rf . The stock yields a risky return, defined as: Rts = Rf + ω + νt , where
ω represents the average risk premium of stocks over bonds, while the stochastic
component of the risky return (νt )t≥0 is an IID normally distributed process with
mean 0 and variance σν2 .
Agents must pay a cost F ≥ 0 to participate in the stock market, which may
be interpreted as the opportunity cost of discovering how the stock market works.
In our baseline model, we assume it is a flat once-in-a-lifetime cost: if the cost is
paid at a given date t by an agent, they can freely trade stocks at date t and at
any date afterwards.13
Finally, an annuity can be purchased in the period before retirement (TR − 1).
The annuity is a financial asset that pays one unit of income every period from TR ,
as long as its holder is alive. The price of a single unit of annuity income, q, is:
q = (1 + δ)

TMX
−TR
τ =1

Qτ

πTR −1+s
,
(Rf )τ

s=0

(13)

where the parameter δ ≥ 0 is a loading factor on annuity. When δ = 0, the annuity
is actuarially fair and its price equals the discounted present value of future payoffs.
The larger is δ, the further is annuity pricing from actuarial fairness. There is one
final annuity market imperfection. Following Pashchenko (2013), annuity purchases
below a minimum threshold (a > 0) are not allowed.
Choices and constraints. If an agent is alive, her resources at the beginning of
the period consist of her wealth, comprising bond, annuity and stock payoffs plus
labor income earned, or public pension income received, in the period. Resources
are used for consumption as well as the purchase of bonds, annuities, and stocks.
The budget constraint of a living agent at date t can then be expressed as follows:
ct + qat + bt + st + 1ηt =1 1ηt−1 =0 F = yt + wt ,
with: wt = aTR −1 1t≥TR + Rf bt−1 + Rts st−1 ,

(14)
(15)

where ct and wt are consumption and wealth in period t and bt , st and at are,
respectively, the quantity of bonds, stocks and annuities purchased in period t.
13

In Appendix C.3, we investigate another participation structure, where the cost must be paid
in every period that an agent wants to buy stocks.
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The index ηt reflects market participation status and is equal to 0 if she has never
paid the participation cost before and therefore never held stocks. The term
1ηt =1 1ηt−1 =0 F in equation (14) represents the fixed cost of participation. Annuity
income is received from age TR and is therefore equal to aTR −1 1t≥TR . No asset,
including annuities, can be sold short. These constraints are summarized here:
st = 0 if ηt = 0,

(16)

at = 0 if t 6= TR − 1,

(17)

aTR −1 = 0 or aTR −1 ≥ a,

(18)

bt ≥ 0, st ≥ 0 and ct > 0

(19)

If an agent is dead at date t, she bequeaths bonds and stocks, but not annuities.
The bequest xt amounts to:
xt = Rf bt−1 + Rts st−1 .

(20)

A feasible allocation is a sequence of choices (ct , bt , at , st , xt , ηt )t≥0 satisfying the
constraints (14)–(20). The set of feasible allocations is denoted A.

4.2

Preferences and agents’ program

Intertemporal preferences. Agents have risk-sensitive preferences. The utility
of an agent at age t when alive, Vt , is defined through the following recursion:
Vt = (1 − β)u(ct ) −


h
i
h
i
β
log πt Et e−kVt+1 + (1 − πt )Et e−k(1−β)v(xt+1 ) ,
k

(21)

where v(xt ) is the instantaneous utility obtained upon dying and bequeathing xt .
Utility is normalized here so that being dead while leaving no bequest provides
utility v(0) = 0.14
Instantaneous utility function specification. We assume that agents have
a constant IES. Formally,


ul

+

c1−σ −1
1−σ

if σ 6= 1,

ul

+ log(c)

if σ = 1,

u(c) = 

(22)

where σ > 0 is the inverse of the IES, and ul is a parameter that provides the
instantaneous utility derived when alive and consuming one unit of consumption
(u(1) = ul ). It can also be interpreted as the difference in utility between being alive
14

With such a normalization the continuation utility when dead, (1 − β)v(xt+1 ) + βv(0),
simplifies to (1 − β)v(xt+1 ).
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and consuming one unit and being dead and bequeathing nothing (ul = u(1)−v(0)).
Since utility has already been normalized when assuming v(0) = 0, we cannot
additionally set ul to an arbitrary value. This parameter must, therefore, be
carefully calibrated. Note that when σ > 1, there necessarily exists a threshold
c below which u(c) < 0, implying that agents would prefer to die and leave no
bequest rather than staying alive. In theory, this threshold could be used to
calibrate ul . However, this would involve basing the calibration on extreme cases
(suicides), for which our model is surely ill-suited (a suicidal decision is a complex
multi-dimensional decision that, needless to say, involves more than poverty). A
preferable calibration strategy, which we will use in Section 4.4, relies on using
agents’ decisions that relate to safety. Since a higher value of ul means a higher
valuation of being alive relative to being dead, the value of ul should be reflected in
the financial decisions that agents make to lower their mortality risks, for example
when investing in safer (but more expensive) cars or opting for safer (but lower
paid) jobs.
The utility derived from bequests, v(x), is assumed to be continuous, increasing
in the bequest amount, and to exhibit bounded and decreasing marginal utility. The
functional form we use has been widely applied (see e.g., De Nardi, 2004, De Nardi
et al., 2010, Ameriks et al., 2011, and Lockwood, 2012 and 2018). Formally,
v(x) =


h

 θ (x + x)1−σ
1−σ



θ log x+x
x

− x1−σ

i

if σ 6= 1,

(23)

if σ = 1,

where σ is the inverse of the IES used in the expression (22) defining the function
u, while θ ≥ 0 governs the strength of the bequest motive. With x > 0, bequests
are a luxury good, as has been shown by, for example, Hurd and Smith (2002).
The derivative v 0 (0) is finite, so that agents bequeath only when their wealth is
large enough (an empirical regularity documented by e.g., De Nardi, 2004).
Agents’ program. The agents’ problem involves determining the feasible allocation in the set A that maximizes utility defined in (21). There is no analytical
solution to this problem. We therefore solve the model numerically. In short, state
variables are discretized and decision rules are obtained for points on the grid by
backwards induction from the last period. Linear approximation is used to evaluate
the value function at points off the grid and integration over earnings and asset
price shocks is carried out using Tauchen (1986). Further details are given in the
Supplemental Material.
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4.3

Value of mortality risk reduction

To properly calibrate ul , we will consider the marginal rate of substitution between
survival probability and wealth, which quantifies how much a given agent is willing
to pay – in terms of wealth – to reduce her mortality risk. This marginal rate of
substitution is most often called the value of a statistical life (VSL, henceforth),
though there have been recent recommendations to use the terminology “value of
mortality risk reduction”.15 The VSL at date t, denoted V SLt , is defined as:
V SLt =

∂Vt
∂πt
∂Vt
∂wt

,

(24)

where wt is wealth and is given in equation (15). This definition is standard and is
used in Rosen (1988), for instance. The formal expressions for the risk-sensitive and
additive models – that will be used to calibrate ul – can be found in Appendix A.2.
Empirical literature on the value of a statistical life. The value of mortality
risk reduction is a central parameter for cost-benefit analyses in many policy
realms. This includes evaluating environmental policy (see U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency 2011 where the value of mortality risk reduction is central in
estimating the benefits of the Clean Air Act), transport policy (see US Department
of Transportation, 2016 on quantifying the benefit of road safety rules) and health
policy (Murphy and Topel, 2006 and Hall and Jones, 2007 or also Greenstone and
Nigam, 2020, Hall et al. 2020, Hammitt, 2020, or Robinson et al., 2020 in the
context of the Covid-19 pandemic).
There are two distinct approaches that have been used to estimate the value of
mortality risk reduction. The first is a revealed preference approach which estimates
it from observed decisions by individuals (e.g., from compensating differentials
associated with risky jobs or willingness to pay for safety features on vehicle purchases). The second is a stated preference approach, where individuals’ valuations
are explicitly elicited by a survey. Both approaches provide a relatively broad
range of estimates. This is not surprising, as any estimate of willingness-to-pay
for mortality risk reduction will depend on individual preferences and individual
financial and demographic characteristics. Broad overviews of the literature and
details on the range of estimates that have been reported can be found in Viscusi
and Aldy (2003) and Kniesner and Viscusi (2019).
15

See https://www.epa.gov/environmental-economics/mortality-risk-valuation for a
discussion.

19

4.4

Calibration

Demographics, endowments and asset market parameters. We describe
here how externally-set parameters, relating to demographics, endowments and
asset markets, are chosen. Table 1 provides a summary.
Table 1: Externally-set parameters
Parameter

Value

Source

Demographics
Retirement date, TR

45

(= 65 − 20)

SSA Historical Normal Retirement Age in US

80

(= 100 − 20)

Maximal life duration, TM
Cond. survival rates, {πt }
Endowments
Average wage, ȳ

Human Mortality Database,
U.S. 2016
US$ 46,640

0.988
0.015

Average net compensation
2016, SSA
Harenberg and Ludwig
(2019)
Average SS replacement
rate (Biggs and Springstead,
2008)
Guvenen (2009)
Guvenen (2009)

1.02
4%
15.7%

Campbell and Viceira (2002)
Campbell and Viceira (2002)
Campbell and Viceira (2002)

US$ 3,680
10%

Pashchenko (2013)
Pashchenko (2013)

Age productivity, {µt }
Public pension, y R

Labor income autocorr., ρ
Var. of persistent shocks, συ2
Asset Markets
Gross risk-free return, Rf
Equity premium, ω
Stock volatility, σν
Annuity Market
Min. annuity purchase, a
Administrative load, δ

40%×ȳ

Taking demographics first, agents retire at the age of 65, which for many years
was the Normal Retirement Age for Social Security in the U.S. Mortality rates are
taken from the Human Mortality Database for the USA for 2016. We assume that
all individuals die at the age of 100 if not before.
Turning to endowments, agents earn a wage in each period up to the age of
64 and receive Social Security payments from the age of 65. The shape of the
deterministic age-productivity profile is taken from Harenberg and Ludwig (2019),
who compute it from PSID data using the method in Huggett et al. (2011). This
series is transformed so that average earnings are set at $46,640, average US
net earnings in 2016 (Social Security Administration, 2020). The values for the
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stochastic component of the income process are taken from Guvenen (2009), who
reports an autoregressive parameter ρ = 0.988 and a variance of persistent shocks
of συ2 = 0.015. Public pensions, y R , are set at 40 percent of the average earnings,
which is approximately the average replacement rate afforded by Social Security
(Biggs and Springstead, 2008). We assume that agents enter the model with no
assets, s−1 = 0 and b−1 = 0.
Turning to the features of our asset market, we follow Campbell and Viceira
(2002). The gross risk-free return is set at Rf = 1.02. We set the equity premium
to ω = 4% and stock volatility is σν = 15.7%. These values represent common
choices in the lifecycle literature (see, for example, Lusardi et al., 2017). We set
the administrative load (δ) to 10% (as in Pashchenko, 2013, Lockwood, 2012, and
in the range of Brown, 2007). We set the minimum annuity purchase to $3,680,
calculated by converting the value in Pashchenko (2013) to 2016 dollars. The final
feature of the asset market, F , the participation cost in the risky asset, is calibrated
to match participation in stock markets – we defer discussion of that to below.
Preference parameters. We set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution to
0.5, so that its inverse is σ = 2, which is a common value in the literature. The
time preference and risk aversion parameters, β and k, and the utility gap between
life and death, ul , are set so that lifecycle behaviors match our calibration targets,
which we will detail later.
To set the bequest function parameters (θ, which governs the intensity of the
bequest motive, and x̄, which governs the extent to which bequests are a luxury
good), we use the estimates of De Nardi et al. (2010), who study the problem of
bequests in detail. Their model, which features additive preferences, implies values
for the IES and the discount factor that differ from ours, and we therefore cannot
directly use their bequest parameters. Our approach is to replicate two targets
implied by their estimates: (i) the maximal wealth at which no bequest is left; and
(ii) the marginal propensity to consume wealth, both of which are computed for a
living agent at the maximal age – such that she dies for sure in the next period –
who can only save in the riskless asset. This removes any risk in the model and the
risk-sensitive model reduces to the additive one. The parameters of De Nardi et al.
(2010) imply a value of $36,000 (in 1998 dollars) for the maximal no-bequest wealth
and of 0.88 for the marginal propensity to bequeath wealth in the last period of
life.16 To match these values, we set x̄ = 8.50 and θ = 56.55.17 See Appendix B for
further details on the calculation of these numbers.
16

These numbers are implied by the estimates in column 3 of Table 3 of their paper. See the
discussion in Appendix D of their paper.
17
x̄ is expressed in units of average income. The dollar equivalent is $396,477.

21

Calibration of remaining parameters. Four parameters are calibrated to
match features of behavior over the lifecycle. These parameters are the utility gap
between life and death (ul ), the discount factor (β), the parameter governing risk
aversion (k), and the cost of participating in stock markets (F ). We calibrate them
by matching four targets: the VSL at age 45, asset holdings at age 65, annuity
holdings at 65 and the proportion of people at 65 who hold risky assets.18
Table 2: Calibration targets
Target
VSL
Mean wealth at age 65
Proportion holding annuities at
age 65
Stock market participation rate
at age 65

Value
$10m
$366,000

Source
Kniesner and Viscusi (2019)
Survey of Consumer Finances

5%

Pashchenko (2013)

50%

Alan (2006)

Notes: See the text for calculation and further details on source.

For the VSL at age 45, we target a mean value of $10m, which is suggested
as a central estimate for the US by the recent review article by Kniesner and
Viscusi (2019). This is close to the value of $9.6m used by the US Department of
Transportation (2016) and in the range of $8.8m–$10.6m, used by the Environmental
Protection Agency (2011) in evaluating the Clean Air Act.
To obtain a target to match mean modeled wealth at the age of 65, we use
the 2016 wave of the Survey of Consumer Finances. We select a sample of single
individuals without children. There are only approximately 100 such individuals
at each age – and so to increase the sample size we calculate the mean for those
between 60 and 69. We winsorize at the 1st and 99th percentiles. This yields a
mean of $366,000. We also show in Appendix C.2 the robustness of our results to
matching mean wealth at 45 instead of age of 65.
We target the proportion of households holding annuities. This proportion in
the U.S. is extremely low (this fact is, of course, the source of the annuity ‘puzzle’).
Lockwood (2012) reports that 3.6% of single retirees hold annuities; Pashchenko
(2013) reports 5%, also for a sample of single retirees. We target the latter, slightly
higher, number.
Finally, participation cost is calibrated (jointly with the preference parameters)
to deliver a stock market participation rate of 50% at age 65, which is in the range
reported by Alan (2006).
18

For the value of life we choose its estimated value at age 45 (and not 65) as a calibration target,
as most empirical studies rely on wage-risk trade-offs and are estimated on samples comprising
those of working age.
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In our results, we will compare our simulated profiles to an additive model
that will also be calibrated to meet these targets. As the risk aversion parameter
k is constrained to equal zero in the additive specification, matching the targets
requires us to add one degree of freedom. To do this, rather than imposing the
10% administrative load (δ), informed by the literature, we find the administrative
load that would rationalize annuity demand.

4.5

Results

Parameter estimates. Table 3 gives our baseline parameter estimates and
also shows, for comparison, the parameter estimates for the additive model. The
estimate for our risk-sensitive model of β, 0.966, is close to values typically estimated
in lifecycle models and additionally is very close to the value (0.97) assumed by
Pashchenko (2013) and Lockwood (2012), two papers which try to rationalize
low annuity-demand. De Nardi et al. (2010), on whose estimates we base our
parameterization of the bequest function, also use a value of 0.97. The specific
values we obtain for ul and k depend on normalization choices we made, and are
best understood by thinking of the trade-off between consumption and life duration
(for ul ) or by looking at how agents compare different lotteries over life duration
(for k). Regarding ul , consider a setting with an agent whose consumption equals
the average annual income. Such an agent endowed with the calibrated value of ul
would be willing to give up about 7% of her consumption during her last year of life
in exchange for one extra week of life. As for an interpretation of the magnitude of
k, which impacts risk aversion with respect to life duration, consider the following
situation. A 65 year-old agent, endowed with the set of preferences estimated in
our baseline model is faced with a previously unanticipated option to undergo some
surgery, knowing that the surgery would increase her life expectancy, but would
involve taking a 5% risk of an immediate death. With our estimated value of k, an
agent would opt for surgery only if the increase in life expectancy (taking account
of the risk of dying in the operation) exceeds 12 months.19 Had we set k = 0 (and
kept all other parameters the same), the agent would opt for the operation when
the increase in life expectancy is as short as 4 months.
The participation cost, at 170% of average annual income, is necessarily large to
match observed (non-)participation in risky assets when the equity premium is 4%,
(see, for example, Mehra and Prescott, 1985 and Kocherlakota, 1996). However,
19

To calculate this, we find the scalar α that, when multiplied by all survival probabilities for
ages after 65, exactly compensates agents, in terms of (ex-ante) utility, for the loss in utility
associated with the additional 5% chance of dying at the age of 65. We can then use this quantity
to calculate the new life expectancy taking into account both the risk of dying in the operation
and the greater survival in each period if she survives.
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note that this is paid only once.20 To place this quantity in perspective, for
those who pay the participation cost, it represents 2.4% of lifetime consumption
(discounted by the risk-free rate).
Table 3: Estimated parameters in baseline economy
Parameter

Risk-Sensitive

Additive Model

2.0†
0.867
3.570
0.966
56.55†
8.50†
10%†

2.0†
0.000†
12.020
0.953
56.55†
8.50†
23%

170% of ȳ

175% of ȳ

Preferences
Inverse of IES, σ
Risk aversion parameter, k
Life-death utility gap, ul
Discount factor, β
Bequest motive strength, θ
Bequest luxury good, x
Annuity administrative load, δ
Asset Markets
Participation cost, F

Notes: One unit of consumption is equal to ȳ. Quantities indicated by a
than estimated.

† are imposed rather

Estimated profiles. Figure 1 shows profiles of mean consumption, wealth, participation in stock market and VSL over the lifecycle for a simulated sample of
individuals. Results are reported for three specifications. The first two correspond
to the calibrated versions of the risk-sensitive (referred to as RS) and additive
(referred to as “calibrated-additive”) models, whose parameters are shown in Table
3. Both models, by construction, match the quantitative targets which are marked
on the graphs and predict that the proportion of individuals holding annuities
is 5%. The third specification, labeled as “uncalibrated-additive” corresponds to
the model obtained while keeping all parameters of the risk-sensitive case fixed,
but setting k = 0 to recover an additive specification. We show these results to
facilitate comparative statics with respect to the risk aversion parameter k.
Comparative risk aversion. RS agents are more risk averse than the “uncalibrated-additive” agents, but are identical in all other aspects. Comparing the
predictions of the RS model with those of the “uncalibrated-additive” model
therefore reflects the theoretical predictions of Section 3 about the role of risk
aversion. The framework here is, though, a richer one than that outlined in Section
3 – in particular with the addition of income and asset return uncertainty. These
20

In Section C, we study participation costs paid every time an agent invests in stock, instead
of once per life. In that calibration, the costs fall to 14% of average income.
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Figure 1: Lifecycle profiles for the baseline calibration
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additions are likely to have important effects: income uncertainty generates a
precautionary savings effect that is amplified with risk aversion.21 The negative
relationship between risk aversion and savings derived in Section 3 will thus be
complemented by a precautionary effect that would imply an opposed relation.
Uncertainty in asset returns may also contribute to a positive or negative relationship
between risk aversion and savings, depending on the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution and lifecycle income profile. The overall impact of risk aversion is
therefore theoretically ambiguous, with its sign depending on the magnitude of
the different risks at play. Figure 1 shows, however, that RS agents save less than
the “uncalibrated-additive” agents. Moreover RS agents are less likely to purchase
annuities (the annuity participation rate is 5% for RS agents compared to 33% for
additive agents). These are in line with the predictions of Proposition 1.
From a quantitative standpoint, this means that the effects of income and
financial risks that we added in this quantitative investigation turn out to be too
small to offset the effect of mortality risk highlighted in our theory section. The
21
See Bommier and LeGrand (2019), who show, using risk-sensitive preferences in an infinite
horizon setting, that there is a positive relationship between risk aversion and precautionary
savings.
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effect of the mortality risk tends therefore to dominate those of other risks. We
can interpret this as an indication that mortality risks loom larger for individuals
in their decision making than do the other risks they face.22
Figure 1 shows also that RS agents have a higher VSL at all ages and are less
likely to invest in stocks than the “uncalibrated-additive” agents. This simply
reflects that risk aversion increases the willingness to reduce exposure to mortality
and financial risks.
Overall, our results regarding the impact of risk aversion highlight that the
more risk averse are individuals, the more they dislike taking risks of any kind,
whether they are related to mortality, income or financial matters. It is worth
noting, however, that our findings strongly contrast with those of well-known
studies in the HF literature, such as Gomes and Michaelides (2005, 2008), who
find a positive relationship between risk aversion and stock market participation,
and Inkmann et al. (2011), who find that risk aversion increases the demand for
annuities. Explanations for these differences are provided in Section 5.
Comparison of the calibrated models. Let us now compare the predictions
of RS and “calibrated-additive” specifications. By construction, both specifications
predict the same accumulated wealth, stock market participation and annuity
market participation at age 65, and the same value of life at age 45. The lifecycle
profiles for consumption, wealth and stock market participation are therefore
similar, though with a divergence in the VSL over the second half of the lifecycle.23
A fundamental difference between the specifications is in how they confront
the ‘annuity puzzle’, that is, how they rationalize realistically low annuity demand.
Low annuity demand is rationalized for additive agents with a counterfactually
high administrative load (23% compared to 10% for the RS agents) and a relatively
low discount factor (0.953 compared to 0.966 in the RS case). RS agents, on the
other hand, are concerned that purchasing annuities may lead to a loss in case of an
early death. Although they value the benefits of holding annuities to insure against
the consumption needs in the case of a long life, they also want to retain significant
investments in bonds or in stocks so that the early death adverse event is mitigated
by the transmission of a bequest to her heirs. This allows a low level of annuity
demand to be rationalized, even if annuities are priced at close to actuarially fair
levels.
22

This fact is also reflected in the very high willingness to pay for mortality risk reduction
revealed by empirical studies, which we used to calibrate our model.
23
Increasing risk aversion leads to a greater willingness to pay to avoid dramatic outcomes,
such as death at young age, as compared to adverse but less dramatic outcomes, such at death at
old age. Increasing risk aversion therefore tends to amplify the relationship between age and VSL.
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4.6

Does the precise VSL value matter?

In Appendix C, we provide an extended sensitivity analysis where we investigate the
robustness of the results to the structure of the participation cost, the calibration
age for the wealth and the target VSL. Here, we provide a brief discussion of the
last of these – the impact of the VSL estimate. We know from our theoretical
section that the choice of a plausible (and hence positive) value of the VSL is
central to the relationship between risk aversion and household choices. A natural
question, given that the empirical literature on VSL does not contain a consensus
estimate of its value, is how much our results would be impacted by choosing a
VSL target in the upper or lower range of empirical estimates.
The value that we choose, $10m, is approximately the level currently used by
US policy-makers. To assess whether this particular choice is instrumental in the
results, we estimate the parameters using the same calibration strategy and the
same calibration targets as in Section 4.4, except that we consider two alternative
targets for the VSL, $7.5m and $12.5m.
The calibrated parameters for the two VSL targets, as well as the plots of
the related lifecycle profiles for consumption, wealth, VSL, and stock market
participation can be found in Appendix C.1. These graphs show clearly that
changing the VSL target has very little impact on individual decisions (consumption,
wealth, asset market participation, and annuity purchase). The only significant
difference between calibrations is on the VSL lifecycle profiles.
The reason that the precise VSL plays little role in agents’ choices when the
VSL is large is that the RS model admits a well-defined limit when the utility of life
becomes infinite and mortality is assumed to be exogenous. To show this, we take
the recursive equation (21) that defines the utility Vt , representing risk-sensitive
preferences, and consider the limit where ul tends to infinity while maintaining
the product kul equal to a constant, which we denote by κ below. This involves
taking the limit where VSL gets increasingly large while maintaining risk aversion
with respect to the life duration constant. It can easily be shown through a firstorder Taylor expansion that the risk-sensitive utility, Vt , can be approximated by
Vt ' k1 Yt + Xt , where Xt and Yt are recursively defined by:
Xt = (1 − β)u(ct )
(25)


β
Yt+1
π
E
[X
]
+
(1
−
π
)e
E
[(1
−
β)v(x
)]
,
+
t
t
t+1
t
t
t+1
πt + (1 − πt )eYt+1


h

i



Yt = (1 − β)κ − β log πt Et e−Yt+1 + 1 − πt .

(26)

Under exogenous mortality, Yt is exogenous, and maximizing Vt is thus equivalent
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to maximizing Xt . For a large VSL, the RS model therefore converges to the
model represented by Xt . Notice that the recursive equation that defines Xt has an
additive structure, similar to the usual additive specification. However, it embeds
an (exogenous) age-dependent discount factor π +(1−πβ )eYt+1 that reflects the impact
t
t
of mortality and risk aversion on impatience.24
Since the results we obtain depend very little on the value of the VSL calibration
target within the empirically relevant range, we deduce that our calibrated model
is in fact relatively close to the infinite utility of life limit. In particular, as long as
the VSL remains large, the uncertainty regarding the precise value of the VSL is of
limited concern. It also means that, to a first-order approximation, the quantitative
model we use could be replaced by a standard additive model with an age-dependent
discount factor. This may be helpful for further applications.

5

Relation to previous studies

Most papers in the HF literature rely on the additive specification, which lacks
the flexibility to fully study the role of risk aversion in decision-making over the
lifecycle. In such papers, the expression “risk aversion” is most often used to refer to
a parameter (σ in our paper) that governs both intertemporal substitutability and
risk preferences. It is, however, well understood that models that assume different
values for the IES are not comparable in terms of risk aversion (see Kihlstrom
and Mirman, 1974, for instance). The findings of those papers cannot therefore be
compared to ours.
The relevant comparison is with the subset of papers, such as Gomes and
Michaelides (2005, 2008), Inkmann et al. (2011) and many others, which, like us,
use recursive preferences to study the role of risk aversion in isolation. A key
difference is that our model was designed to fit empirical estimates of the VSL,
without imposing preference homotheticity, while these papers typically use EZW
preferences to obtain homothetic (and tractable) specifications without considering
the implications for the VSL.
Formally, for EZW preferences, in the presence of bequests the recursion (7)
defining the utility conditional on being alive becomes:


Vt = (1 −

β)c1−σ
t

+β



h

1−γ
Et πt Vt+1
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+ (1 −

πt )θx1−γ
t+1

1
i 1−σ  1−σ
1−γ

,

(27)

While the model obtained when maximizing Xt features age-dependent time discounting, it
is time consistent. Preferences are not stationary (they depend on age, reflecting the relationship
between age and mortality), but they do not exhibit preference reversals.
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where, as in (23), θ determines the intensity of the bequest motive.25 There is
typically no discussion of the value of mortality risk reduction in HF papers, as
they assume that mortality is exogenous. Equation (27) nevertheless implicitly
assumes a specific sign for the value of mortality risk reduction. In particular:
1−γ 
1−γ
h
i γ−σ
]
] − θEt [xt+1
Et [Vt+1
∂Vt
1−γ
1−γ
1−γ
=β
Et πt Vt+1
+ (1 − πt )θxt+1
Vtσ ,
∂πt
1−γ

which can be positive or negative. If γ > 1, as is assumed in the papers referenced
Et [V 1−γ ]
above, a positive value of mortality risk reduction is obtained only if θ > E [xt+1
1−γ .
t t+1 ]
The results of Gomes and Michaelides (2005, 2008) and those of Inkmann et al.
(2011) indicate that this condition does not hold (at least not always) in their
simulations.26 In particular, a negative value of mortality risk reduction is systematically obtained when there is no bequest motive (θ = 0), a case considered in
several instances in those papers. With a negative value of mortality risk reduction,
risk aversion is found to amplify savings. This difference in saving behavior, in turn,
generates differences in the propensity to pay the stock market participation cost.
This explains why Gomes and Michaelides (2005, 2008) find that more risk averse
agents tend to participate more frequently in the stock market. Moreover, with
a negative value of mortality risk reduction, the risk of losing annuitized wealth
in case of an early death is not seen as a major concern, as short lives are seen as
good outcomes. This impacts the willingness to purchase annuities, which is found
to increase with risk aversion (Inkmann et al., 2011). Overall, with a negative VSL,
risk aversion is found to increase savings, stock market participation and annuity
purchases, providing conclusions which are opposite to ours. This is fully in line
with the theoretical results developed in Section 3, where we discussed the case of
a (counterfactual) negative value of mortality risk reduction.
In the VoL literature, the recursive models of Hugonnier et al. (2013) and
Córdoba and Ripoll (2017) do not account for bequest motives and thus do not
investigate the trade-offs between annuity and bond purchases. Savings are found
to decrease with risk aversion (in line with our findings) when the IES is above
1, but the relationship is opposite when the IES is below 1. The reason for
25

A formal derivation of equation (27) can be found in the appendix of Gomes et al. (2009), for
example.
26
One should notice, moreover, that if specification (27) were to be used with γ > 1 and a
parameter θ large enough to generate positive values of mortality risk reduction, we would obtain
a framework that is still non-monotone and where the intensity of the bequest motive would
∂ 2 Vt
increase the willingness to pay for mortality risk reduction: ∂π
> 0. However, this would go
t ∂θ
against intuition, since deriving utility from bequest reduces the welfare gap between life and
death. In models such as the RS or additive models, which this paper argues are better suited to
studying decisions in the face of mortality risk, altruism has a negative impact on the value of
mortality risk reduction (see equations (38) and (39) for instance) – as one would expect.
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these opposite findings is not related to the sign of the VSL (which is positive in
their analyses) but is a consequence of the non-monotonicity that we discussed
in the cake-eating example of Section 2.4. Those models imply a time-varying
1−σ

discount factor proportional to π t1−γ .27 This implies that when γ < 1 < σ, an
agent who survives with probability πt < 1 saves more than if she was sure to
survive. This result echoes the monotonicity breakdown we emphasized in the
cake-eating example discussed in Section 2.4. As noted in discussing the example,
the departure from monotonicity gets quite extreme when πt gets small. Indeed if
1−σ

πt → 0, meaning that period t is almost surely the last period of life, then π t1−γ
tends to +∞. In this case, the propensity to consume in period t vanishes and
the agent saves everything to consume in the subsequent period, even though she
will almost certainly not live to see it. Notice that this tendency to over-save (as
compared to non-dominated strategies) is also magnified when the risk aversion
parameter γ increases towards one (while keeping σ > 1 and πt fixed). Increasing
risk aversion increases the extent to which dominated strategies are chosen. This
drives the positive relationship between savings and risk aversion found in those
papers.

6

Conclusion

Inspired by Samuelson (1937), economic contributions on intertemporal choice have
most often relied on models that assume time-additive preferences. While timeadditive preferences offered an elegant framework to formalize insightful theories,
such as Modigliani’s lifecycle hypothesis, they have some serious limitations. One
of the caveats associated with the time-additive model is its lack of flexibility,
in particular, the fact that its use means that risk aversion and intertemporal
substitutability cannot be disentangled. This was underlined both by theoreticians
(Epstein and Zin, 1989) and experimentalists (Andersen et al., 2008). Theoretical
contributions, such as those of Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990), have
addressed this limitation by introducing a recursive framework that is both tractable
and flexible. These EZW preferences have met with a remarkable success. While
EZW preferences were initially developed to deal with infinitely-lived agents, their
adaptation to finite and random horizon settings encountered the serious difficulties
that we discussed in Section 2.
In the current paper, we propose a framework that can model lifecycle behaviors with recursive preferences that are well-defined, flexible, monotone and can
simultaneously match realistic (positive) values for mortality risk reduction and
27

See for example, from equation (15) in Córdoba and Ripoll (2017).
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plausible lifecycle profiles for consumption and wealth. We outline how using such
a specification facilitates new and intuitive insights on the role of risk aversion,
affording a potential explanation for several documented – though imperfectly
understood – household behaviors, such as the low demand for annuities.
In an era of on-going demographic changes, the economics of aging will remain
a key research area, with new forms of risks becoming increasing sources of concern
(not least the increased likelihood of expensive long-term care at the oldest ages).
While time-additive preferences have facilitated valuable insights, we argue that the
field would benefit from a framework that allows decisions in the face of survival
risk to be studied in a setting where the role of risk aversion can be separated from
that of intertemporal substitutability. The approach put forward in this paper
could serve as a foundation of such a framework for both the HF and the VoL
literatures.
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Appendix
A
A.1

Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1

Note that at the optimum, we must have bk > 0 and w0 − bk − ak > 0. We focus
on the case where ak > 0. The first-order conditions of the consumption problem
(12) yields after some arrangement:
a
k(1−β)
ak
−
(u(Rf bk +Rf πk )−v(Rf bk ))
0
= bk e σ
,
(28)
π0


a
w0 − bk − ak
k(1−β)(u(Rf bk +Rf πk )−v(Rf bk )) 1
f 1−σ − σ1
σ.
0
=
(β(R
)
)
(29)
π
+
(1
−
π
)e
0
0
bk + aπk0

bk +

k
k
We define a0k = ∂a
, b0k = ∂b
, κ = k(1−β)
(Rf )1−σ > 0, and ∆ = k(1 − β)(u(Rf bk +
∂k
∂k
σ
Rf aπk0 ) − v(Rf bk )) and obtain from (28) and (29):

b0k +
bk +

a0k
π0
ak
π0

b0k +
b0k + a0k
+
w0 −bk −ak bk +

a0k
π0
ak
π0

ak
a0
κ
b0k
0
− κ((bk + )−σ (b0k + k ) − b−σ
k bk ) − ∆,
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π0
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k
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0
κ(b−σ
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ak −σ 0
) (bk
π0
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))+ κk ∆
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+
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(1 − π0 )e∆
. (31)

Equations (30) and (31) yield:
b0k = −λb0k a0k ,
with: λb0k =

(32)
1
w0 −bk −ak

1
w0 −bk −ak

+
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1
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(33)
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(34)

(1−π0 )e∆
1
bk π0 +(1−π0 )e∆

which is positive for all values of ∆. We obtain from (32):
a0k + b0k =

ak (1−π0 )e∆
1
a
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We also obtain from (32):
a0k
+ b0k = λ a0k 0 a0k ,
+bk
π0
π0
λ a0k
π0

+b0k

=

(35)
(1−π0 )e∆
1
1
bk π0 +(1−π0 )e∆ π0
∆
π0
0 )e
+ b1k π0(1−π
π0 +(1−π0 )e∆
+(1−π0 )e∆

1−π0
1
w0 −bk −ak π0
1
w0 −bk −ak

+

1
a
bk + πk

0

+

32

> 0.
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∂ c0,k
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=
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0
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), we obtain using (29), (34), and (35):
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We therefore deduce from (32), (34), (35), and (36), that − ∂b
, − ∂k0,k , ∂k1,k , and
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∂
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k
which implies that ∂a
has the same sign as −∆ (when k > 0). Since the sign of ∆
∂k
0
, this concludes the proof.
is the same as the sign of ∂V
∂π0

A.2

Deriving VSL expressions

We denote by wt = At−1 + Rf bt−1 + Rts st−1 the beginning-of-period wealth by
ωt = qt at + bt + st the total saving choice, by αtb = ωbtt the share in bonds and by
αts = ωstt the share in stocks. The program of the alive agent can be rewritten as:
Vt (wt , At−1 , ηt−1 , ζt−1 ) =

max

ct ≥0,ωt ≥0,(αbt ,αst )∈[0,1]2

(1 − β)u(ct )


h
i
h
i
β
− log πt Et e−kVt+1 (wt+1 ,At ,ηt ,ζt ) + (1 − πt )Et e−k(1−β)v(xt+1 ) ,
k

subject to: yt + wt = ct + ωt + 1ηt =1 1ηt−1 =0 F , wt = At−1 + ωt ( q1t + (Rf − q1t )αtb +
s
s
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The envelope theorem yields ∂w
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and ωqtt (1 − αtb − αts ) = at , after some manipulation, we get:
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and in the additive case, by continuity for k → 0:
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B

Calibration of bequest parameters

To calibrate bequest parameters, we compute the marginal propensity to consume
(MPC) and the maximum wealth at which no bequest will be left for an agent in
the last period before certain death, when she can only invest in a riskless bond.
Up to a factor (1 − β)−1 , her program is: maxb∈R u(W − b) + βv(Rf b). There are
two cases. (i) No bequest is left iff u0 (W ) ≥ βRf v 0 (0). (ii) Otherwise, there is a
positive bequest, determined by: u0 (W − b) = βRf v 0 (Rf b), which implies that the
maximal no-bequest wealth, denoted by W0 , solves u0 (W0 ) = βRf v 0 (0), or using
the expressions (22) and (23) for instantaneous utility functions:


W0 = κx, with κ = βRf θ

− 1

σ

(40)

.

If W ≥ W0 , the agent’s FOC implies for the optimal bequest b and for the MPC is:
b=

C

W − κx
∂c
Rf κ
and
=
.
1 + κRf
∂W
1 + Rf κ

(41)

Sensitivity analysis

C.1

High and low targets for the VSL

We calibrate the model using the same targets as in the baseline calibration,
except that we consider in turn, a high VSL target of 12.5 million USD (+25%
compared to the baseline) and a a low VSL target of 7.5 million (−25% compared
to the baseline). We report in Table 4 the value of parameters whose calibration
Table 4: Parameter calibration with low and high VSL targets
Parameter

Low VSL
RS
Additive

High VSL
RS
Additive

0.60
0.00†
4.81
15.01
0.966
0.953
†
10%
23%
167% of ȳ 175% of ȳ
Notes: One unit of consumption is equal to ȳ. Quantities indicated by a † are imposed rather
Risk aversion parameter, k
Life-death utility gap, ul
Discount factor, β
Annuity admin. load, δ
Participation cost, F

1.49
2.30
0.965
10%†
161% of ȳ

0.00†
9.03
0.953
23%
175% of ȳ

than estimated.

is impacted compared to the baseline. Individual lifetime profiles are almost
unchanged, as can be seen in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Lifecycle profiles for different VSL targets
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Changing the wealth target age from age 65 to age 45

In this subsection we show the sensitivity of our results to the calibration age for
the wealth target, which we change from age 65 to age 45. All other targets remain
unchanged (including the VSL). Table 5 shows the parameter values obtained in
this calibration and allows them to be compared to the baseline.
Table 5: Parameter calibration with age 45 for the wealth target
Parameter
Risk aversion parameter, k
Life-death utility gap, ul
Discount factor, β
Annuity administrative load, δ
Participation cost, F

Risk-Sensitive

Additive Model

1.90
2.49
0.977
10%†
210% of ȳ

0.00†
9.68
0.976
54%
330% of ȳ

The main differences in this specification’s calibration concern: (i) the annuity
administrative load, δ (now required to be 54% in the additive model in order to
match annuity demand, compared to the value of 23% of the baseline calibration);
(ii) the participation cost, F (increases to 210%, from 170% for the RS model, but
more substantially to 330% from 175% for the additive model). Targeting wealth
at age 45 requires more substantial financial market imperfections than in the
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Figure 3: Lifecycle profiles for different targets regarding median wealth age
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baseline calibration. This sensitivity exercise reinforces our conclusions in Section
4.5 regarding the comparison between RS and additive models.
Figure 3 reports the lifetime profiles for the baseline and for the case when age
45 is targeted. Quantitative differences are modest.

C.3

Participation cost every period

We here assume that the stock market participation cost is paid in every period in
which an agent trades stocks. This follows Fagereng et al. (2017), among others.
The budget constraint (14) when alive becomes:
ct + bt + st + F 1st >0 = yt + Rf bt−1 + Rts st−1 .
The rest of the agent’s program remains unchanged. The new values for the
calibrated parameters are displayed in Table 6. The main difference compared
to the baseline is the participation cost now falls from a one-off charge of 170%
of annual income to annual cost of 14.2% of average income. Our substantive
conclusions are unaffected by this choice.
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Table 6: Parameter calibration with annual participation cost
Parameter
Risk aversion parameter, k
Life-death utility gap, ul
Discount factor, β
Annuity administrative load, δ
Annual Participation cost, F

Risk-Sensitive

Additive Model

0.95
3.50
0.967
10%†
14.2% of ȳ

0.00†
12.273
0.953
23%
14.4% of ȳ
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